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 In recent years Deutsche Bank reported large losses, 
mainly as a consequence of financial penalties and an extremely 
compressed interest rate margin environment, accounting this way 
a record loss of €6.7Bn in 2015. In Europe the ECB is expected to 
raise interest rates by the end of 2019, which will play a positive 
impact on Deutsche Bank and the overall European Banking 
Sector. 
 At the time of this report Deutsche Bank is experiencing 
strong depreciations in the Equity Markets having reached all-time 
lows, losing almost 50% of its market capitalization in 2018 alone. 
To contribute to this drop in price are latest scandals regarding 
money laundering and the bank’s financial fragility over recent 
years. 
 Deutsche Bank is represented all over the world in its three 
main business categories, however is part of the bank’s strategic 
decisions to focus in Germany, in an attempt to recoup for lost 
market share. The bank is also committed to reduce “Non-Interest 
Expenses”, having set the target at €21Bn by the end of 2021, a 
reduction of 15% over 2017. Furthermore, as part of this strategy, 
in 2018 Deutsche Bank sold its operations in Portugal and Poland 
to reduce the group’s complexity. 
 The target price at the end of 2019 was the result of a 
Flow-to-Equity valuation method, which is most appropriate for 
financial institutions. This valuation method yield a result of €7.93 
per share. 
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Company Overview 
Headquartered in Frankfurt, Deutsche Bank is currently the largest Bank in 
Germany and the 4th largest in Europe, by the amount of assets. It operates in 
60 countries, represented by a total of 97,535 employees over 2,425 branches1. 
It is based in 3 core corporate divisions: Asset Management (AM), Corporate & 
Investment Banking (CIB) and Private and Commercial Banking (PCB). It takes 
part in the DAX-30 stock exchange with a market capitalization of €15Bn2.  
History 
In early 1870’s, several private bankers joint forces and created what is today 
known as Deutsche Bank. The two main founders were Adelbert Delbrück and 
Ludwig Bambergeras, whose goal was to create a financial institution that 
transacted “banking business of all kinds, in particular to promote and facilitate 
trade relations between Germany, other European countries and overseas 
markets” 1. 
The bank started by having a strong impact in the development of Germany’s 
electrical, chemicals and steel industries. These were the first steps taken by 
Deutsche Bank, beginning its expansion period, with the creation of strategic 
partnerships with larger banks, in the main German Industrial regions. Before the 
turn of the century, Deutsche Bank already had presence overseas, with 
operations in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Asia. 
The first half of the XX century turned out be hard for Deutsche Bank. By end of 
the World War I the bank had lost most of its foreign business, despite the strong 
investment and extension of the German branches network (thought mergers 
with regional banks). In 1929 the bank merged with the largest competitor, 
Disconto-gesellschaft, to form “Deutsche Bank und Disconto-Gesellschaft” later 
renamed as Deutsche Bank. The timing of this merge turned out to be on point to 
help facing the unfolding world economic and banking crisis. To make matters 
worse, the establishment of Hitler’s regime made Deutsche Bank a tool of the 
Nazi State, leaving it on the verge of Bankruptcy by the end of World War II. 
 
 
 
 
1 
Company Report  
2 
As of 3 January 2019 
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From 1950’s onwards international issuing business grew in volume and became 
important as “Germany moved from being a debtor to being a creditor nation3”. 
During the 70’s, expansion was the primary focus for the bank, leading to the 
acquisition of major banks in Italy, Spain, the UK and the United States. 
In 2008 Deutsche Bank experienced its biggest “financial hit” since the World 
War II, resulting in some judicial cases in the subsequent years, for economical 
misconduct during the time that preceded the crisis, leading to severe financial 
and reputational consequences for the bank. 
Shareholder Structure 
Deutsche Bank has revealed a rather consistent capital structure over time, 
which has been practically the same for the last 5 years. Currently in divided in 2 
parts, in which 19% belongs to Private Investors and the remaining to Institutional 
Investors (including other banks). The largest shareholder at the date of this 
report is BlackRock, owning 6.55% of Deutsche Bank3.  
Being a German bank, as it would be expected, the greatest share of capital is 
located in Germany itself. This ranking of capital distribution is followed by the 
European Union and the U.S.. 
By the end of 2017, Deutsche Bank’s market capitalization was €32.8Bn, €9Bn 
more than the previous year. This substantial increase was the result of a carried 
out Capital Increase of €8.0Bn in April 2017, where 687.5 million new common 
shares were issued. In this operation 98.92% of the subscription rights were 
exercised, converting in 680.1 million new shares, each at this price of €11.65. 
The remaining newly issued stocks, were sold on the secondary market at an 
average price of €15.50 per share. 
Despite this large rise in market capitalization, the net increase in Equity Value in 
2017 was just €3.3Bn while compared to 2016, justified by the net losses 
attributable to shareholders (€751 million), Dividends (€392 million), net losses by 
from exchange rates (€2.6Bn), reduction of unrealized gains (losses) of both 
financial assets available for sale and derivatives hedging the variability of cash 
flows (€348 million) and additional coupons paid (€398 million).  
By the end of 2018, this reality is extremely far off. Due to a series of 
depreciations in the financial markets, the bank’s market cap plunged more than 
half of it was worth in the beginning of the year. 
 
 
 
3 
Company Report 
Figure 2: Geographic Distribution 
of Share Ownership 
Source: Company Report 
Figure 1: Deutsche Bank’s 
Largest Shareholders 
Source: Company Report 
Source: Company Report 
Figure 3: Deutsche Bank’s 
Market Cap. (in €Bn) 
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Equity Markets 
At the time of this report, Deutsche Bank has been facing large depreciations in 
the Equity Markets, having lost more than 50% of its market value just during the 
year of 2018 alone. 
These consecutive depreciations are motivated by the lost in market share in its 
home country. In 2015 Deutsche Bank was the number one lender in Germany, 
however by the 3rd quarter of 2018 it was 5th 4. The bank is no longer considered 
the backbone of the German Industry, as its biggest customers start to be less 
and less dependable on it. Competitors like BNP Paribas, Goldman Sachs and 
ING Group NV started to capture customers in Germany, putting even more 
pressure on the bank. 
Having grown from a regional bank to a world player a little over a decade ago, 
Deutsche Bank became one of the biggest Investment Banks in the world, 
however when the financial crisis hit, the weakness behind Deutsche’s Bank 
management and financial practices were brought to public, leading to massive 
losses and litigation costs for the bank. As a consequence of this decline in the 
Bank’s activities, Deutsche has moved from €2.28 trillion in 2011 worth of assets 
to just €1.38 in last quarter4. 
To make matters worse, Deutsche Bank was recently associated with the money 
laundering scandal around Danske Bank, accused of processing more than 
$150Bn worth of payments between the years of 2007 and 2015. After the bank 
confirmed to Reuters these operations, the stock price reach all-time lows. 
As a consequence of these series of events as well as quarterly results that did 
not meet shareholders expectations, a downward pressure on the bank’s share 
prices is higher than ever. To worsen the current situation, customer’s confidence 
on the bank starts to be affected.  
The $7.2Bn Fine 
At the end of 2016, Deutsche Bank was accused by the U.S. Department of 
Justice of misleading its clients to invest in Residential Mortgage-Backed 
Securities (RMBS) between the years of 2005 and 2007, contributing directly to 
the severe effects of 2008 Financial Crisis. 
 
4 
Bloomberg. 2018. Sewing’s Options Dwindle as Deutsche Bank Hit by Fresh Scandals. [ONLINE] Available at: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-01/sewing-s-options-dwindle-as-deutsche-bank-hit-by-fresh-
scandals  
Source: Bloomberg 
Figure 4: Deutsche Bank’s Share 
Price (in €) 
Source: German borrower loan 
data compiled by Bloomberg 
 
Figure 5: Market Share in 
German Loan Market (in %) 
Source: Bloomberg 
Figure 6: Deutsche Bank’s Share 
Price November 2018 (in €) 
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The investigation proved that Deutsche Bank advised its customers to “put their 
money” in the RMBS, despite the bank being fully aware of the risks and truly 
nature of the products, as the final investigation report stated that: 
•       “Deutsche Bank knew that for some securitized loan pools, more than 50 
percent of the loans subjected to due diligence did not meet originators’ 
guidelines5”; 
• “Deutsche Bank concealed from investors that significant numbers of 
borrowers had second liens on their properties5”; 
• “Deutsche Bank purchased and securitized loans with substantial 
defects to provide “flexibility” to the mortgage originators5”; 
• Deutsche Bank knew that the samples of loans used to conduct its due 
diligence “failed to capture the loans that did not meet representations to 
investors5”; 
In mid-September 2016 the regulator made a preliminary proposal for the fine at 
around $14Bn, well above the expected by the annalists ($2Bn - $5Bn). To make 
matters worse, the bank had only made a €5.5Bn litigation provision in the year 
before, making investors concerned about the capability of Deutsche Bank to pay 
the bill. 
As a result, Deutsche Bank’s stock price plunged more than 8% at that day, 
losing a little over 11% of its value during that month. 
In the end, the fine was far lower than the $14Bn initially asked, however it was 
still the largest applied to a single institution from the investigations carried out by 
the U.S. Department of Justice. As a consequence of this reduction in the fine, 
the bank managed to restore some trust on its financial capability, resulting in the 
recovery of the stock price during the month of December 2016, with a climb 
above 14%. 
The $7.2Bn fine was split in two parts, in which $3.1Bn were allocated to a civil 
monetary penalties and the remaining was used to the “relief to homeowners, 
borrowers and communities harmed by its practices6”. As the result of this fines, 
2015 and 2016 turned out to be the years when Deutsche Bank experienced a 
record value for Net Income Losses, reporting a €6.7Bn and €1.3Bn respectably. 
This litigation expenses were carried out under “Non-Interest Expenses” in the 
Income Statement. 
 
5 
The United States Department of Justice. 2018. Deutsche Bank Agrees to Pay $7.2 Billion for Misleading Investors 
in its Sale of Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities. [ONLINE]  Available at: 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/deutsche-bank-agrees-pay-72-billion-misleading-investors-its-sale-residential-
mortgage-backed 
6 Company Press Release 
Source: Company Report 
Figure 7: Deutsche Bank’s Non-
Interest Expenses (in €m) 
Source: Bloomberg 
Figure 9: Deutsche Bank’s Share 
Price September 2016 (in €) 
Source: U.S. Department of 
Justice 
Figure 8: Fines by the U.S. 
Department of Justice (in €Bn) 
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Macroeconomic Overview 
For the last years European Union (EU) countries are experiencing an economic 
recovery from the 2008 financial crisis. GDP is well above 2% growth per year in 
the EU and projections are optimist for the years to come, notwithstanding at 
slower pace. Germany has also been experiencing the same trend as the EU, 
however at a lower growth rate. GDP growth for Germany is expected to be 
around 1% between 2020 and 2023. Looking to the World as a whole, GDP 
growth rates reach consistently higher values, mainly due to the contribution of 
the Emerging Markets and Developing Economies. 
Labour markets, as expected, went along with the recent economic recovery, 
which translates in the reduction of the unemployment rate in all different 
geographies. Unemployment rates are reaching all-times lows, as it is expected 
for them to be around 7.0% in the EU, 6.3% in the World and a stronger 3.5% in 
Germany by the end of 2018. However is important to be not over optimistic 
regarding this topic, once the positive development in unemployment rates is 
expected to slow down, converging to 6.7% in the EU, 3.8% in Germany and 
6.3% in the World by 2023. 
As it is known, consumer spending has been the main driver for the economic 
recovery for the last years, which is highly dependent on the Employment Rates. 
So, bearing in mind the slower reduction in the unemployment rates for the 
future, it is forecasted that wage growth will be constraint, leading to a negative 
impact in private consumer spending. In the EU, consumer spending is expected 
to reached a peak of 8.95% growth by the end of 2018, however more 
conservative for the midterm, converging to 3.99% growth by 2023. Regarding to 
a world approach, consumer spending has a more optimistic outlook, with a 
steady growth rate around 5% until 2023. 
Nonetheless, it is important to consider some sources of risk that might 
jeopardize this future economic outlook. 
The current economic environment is experiencing a period of low interest rates, 
as a consequence of the measures taken by the ECB and Quantitative-Easing 
programme, which started in 2015. In a low interest rate environment the risk of a 
potential asset bubble becomes greater, which raises concerns about the stability 
of this prices and the possibility of a price correction. Following this topic, 
Konstantin A. Kholodilin and Claus Michelsen investigators at DIW, one of the 
main German Economic Research Institutes, developed a report about the signs 
of a housing bubble in OECD countries. The study concluded that “in recent 
years, prices for houses and condominiums have risen, sometimes significantly 
Figure 11: German GDP Growth 
Rate (past and forecast) % 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Source: Eurostat 
Figure 10: World GDP Growth 
Rate (past and forecast) % 
Source: International Labour 
Organization (ILO) / Eurostat 
Figure 12: Unemployment Rates 
(past and forecast) % 
Source: International Labour 
Organization (ILO) / Eurostat 
Figure 13: Consumer Spending 
Growth Rate (past and forecast) 
% 
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in many countries 7” and that in several OECD countries price dynamics are 
driven by speculative investment. Regarding the German housing market, the 
focus of this report, there is no evidence of the existence of a housing bubble, as 
indicators show solid financial condition, despite the need for precautionary 
measures. 
Additionally, December 2018 marked the end of the asset purchase, which was 
responsible for the purchase of more than €2.6 trillion worth of sovereign bonds, 
at a peak rate of €80 million per month in 2017. Regarding the future after the 
end of this programme is still unknown, but what is known is that in an well-
functioning markets new information is immediately incorporated in the prices, so 
is not expected a big shift from the path that markets are having. Regarding the 
interest rates set by the ECB, it is currently at a Base Deposit Rate of -0.4% and 
despite the FED having already started to increase their nominal interest rates, it 
is only expected that the first increase in the Interests rates will happen in 2019, 
until the end of Mario Draghi’s mandate.  
In addition to all of these concerns regarding the future, it is also important to 
point out that in Europe there are other geopolitical situations that could 
destabilize its economy. The UK and the Brexit, the Embargo of the EU to Russia 
and the migration crisis are some of them. 
Collateralized Loan Obligation 
With interest rates as low as they are at this moment, investors face a hard time 
looking for solutions regarding investing their money. One financial product that 
has been starting to raise some attention is the Collateralized Loan Obligation 
(CLO), which is similar to the Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO), the 
main responsible for the 2008 financial crisis. The CLOs, instead of being backed 
by mortgages loans, are formed by pools of pour rating corporate loans, made to 
companies that are already carrying a debt load. 
According to Bloomberg, just in the third quarter of 2018 the CLOs represented 
€17.4Bn of new issues, which turns out to be a 17% growth compared to the 
same period in the previous year (2017 closed at €20Bn). Still in 2017, the loan 
sales in Europe reached a value of €144Bn, 36% more than 2016, which shows 
that this market is developing fast. A big part of this assets sold, are allocated to 
the pools of assets that form new CDOs.  
 
7 
Kholodilin, Konstantin A. and Michelsen, Claus. (2018)  “Signs of new housing bubble in many OECD countries - 
lower risk in Germany”, DIW Weekly Report, p276-285. 
 
Source: ECB 
Figure 15: Average amount of 
assets purchased per month by 
the ECB (in €Bn) 
Source: ECB & FED 
Figure 14: ECB Deposit Rates vs 
FED Rates (Past and analysts 
forecast) % 
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With interest rates on the rise again, some similarities are started to be drawn 
with the subprime crisis in 2008. In the U.S., the fiscal benefits associated 
holding debt has helped companies to boost their earnings. According to Moody’s 
Analytics, the “default rates on leveraged are expected to remain low”, although it 
is predictable that it will increase as economic growth starts to slow down and 
interest rates rise, as ECB is expected to do and FED already did. 
So, in case interest rates start to hike in a way that corporations cannot keep up 
with, investors will be directly affected as well as the overall economy, as it 
happened in 2008 with the mortgage backed securities.  
Banking Sector 
Currently it is lived a “Post Crisis” economic environment, with a solid GDP 
Growth all around the world, low inflation, high indebtedness in the public and 
private sectors and low interest rates, mainly in the EU, where ECB is yet to raise 
interest rates. 
Since 2011 the interest rate on loans granted to Non-Financial Corporations has 
fell over 55% in the EU. In consumer loans were the mortgage loans that 
experienced the largest drop in interest rates. Interest rate on deposits 
experienced the same trend (Figure 16). As a consequence of this reduction in 
the cost of holding a loan, 2017 marked a record year for loans growth, with 
special focus on Consumption Loans and Housing, with a change of 7.1% and 
3.3% respectively when compared to the previous year. An interesting fact is that 
despite near to zero interests, deposits are facing a strong growth over the years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This low interest rate environment puts extra pressure on banks, that despite 
having lower funding costs, face higher difficulties in generating their own interest 
margins, which have been compressed over recent times. As it is possible to 
confirm in Figure 20, in Germany banks have been experiencing reduction 
around 50% in their interest margin for both Housing and Corporate Loans, the 
major contributors to Interest Income. According to the ECB, in the Eurozone, 
Source: ECB 
Figure 16: Average annualized 
agreed rate on deposits in the EU 
% 
Source: ECB 
Figure 18: Growth Rate in 
granted loans in the EU % 
Source: ECB 
Figure 19: Growth Rate in 
deposits in the EU % 
Source: ECB 
Figure 17: Average Annualized 
agreed rate on loans in the EU % 
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from 3 years now, since the start of the Quantitative-Easing Program, banks have 
lost a little bit over than 40% in their interest margin. In 2019, when it is expected 
for ECB to raise deposit rates again, banks will reduce the pressure that they 
have on Interest Income. In the U.S. banks are already recovering from this 
stress, as the FED increased the interests, so the same it will expected in the EU. 
On top of this interest margin problem, banks are dealing with strict post crisis 
capital requirements, not allowing for extreme leverage positions as before, 
forcing them to increase their capital base.  
Basel Regulation 
The Financial Crisis of 2007-09 brought to day light the liquidity fragilities of the 
Banking System, creating the need for stronger capital requirements that limited 
banks excess leverage.  
Basel III capital requirements were published by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) to combat the causes of the 2008 financial crisis, 
acting as a strength version of Basel II. Basel III is divided in three pillars and it is 
defined as an international agreed set of measures aiming on enhance “the 
stability of the financial system by increasing both quantity and quality of 
regulatory capital and liquidity8”. 
 Capital 
In banking regulation, Capital Ratios depend upon Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) 
and Capital Buffers. 
With Basel III, the minimum requirement for common equity is 4.5% of the total 
RWA and a Total Tier 1 capital requirement of 6%. The capital conservation 
buffer must be met at 2.5% using exclusively common equity. Furthermore, there 
is a countercyclical buffer, with a focus on the national level distress events of 
each bank, and it varies from 0 to 2.5% of common equity or other fully loss-
absorbing capital. 
Additionally, to banks that are considered to be Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions (SIFIs) there are extra absorbency requirements that range from 1% 
to 2.5% of total RWA.  
 
 
 
 
8 
Schneider et al (2017)  “Basel “IV”: What’s next for banks?”, McKinsey & Company, p15. 
Source: ECB 
Figure 21: EU Bank’s Interest 
Margins % 
Source: ECB 
Figure 20: German Bank’s 
Interest Margins % 
Source: Company Report 
Figure 23: Deutsche Bank’s 
Capital Ratios over the years (%) 
Source: BCBS 
Figure 22: Basel III Pillars 
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Once Deutsche Bank is designated as a “Global Systemically Important 
Institution”, it has to comply with G-SII, which is an additionally buffer. For 2018, 
the capital requirements from Basel III impacted the bank’s capital management 
in the following manner: 
• Total CET requirement of 10.65% 
• Total Tier 1 requirement of 12.15% 
• Total Capital requirement of 14.15% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As it is possible to observe in Figure 24, Deutsche’s Bank Capital Requirements 
have always been met in a conservative way, being well above the minimum 
obligatory. Looking at its peers, the same behaviour is observed. Additionally, it is 
important to state that is part of  Deutsche’s Bank financial targets to continue to 
have such excess capital over the minimum required, maintaining its Tier 1 
Capital Ratio “comfortably above 13% at all times9 ”. 
 Liquidity 
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio is one of key ratios when referring to a bank’s 
regulatory liquidity. The BCBS requires this ratio to be a least 100%, with the 
intention to assure that in a scenario of funding distress, banks have enough 
high-quality liquid assets to “survive” it least during 30 days. Like Capital 
Requirements, banks opt to have a strong LCR, well above the minimum 
required (Figure 25). 
Looking at the longer run, the BCBS set the Net Sable Funding Ratio (NSFR) 
also at a minimum level of 100%, measure taken with the goal of incentivising 
banks to creating a solid and stable funding avoiding this way fundamental  
 
9 
Deutsche Bank Annual Report (2017) 
Source: Company Reports 
Figure 24: Capital Requirements across Banks % (2017) 
Source: Company Reports 
Figure 25: Liquidity Coverage 
Ratios across Banks (in %) 
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funding crisis that could compromise the entire bank structure. The 
implementation of the NSFR is still an ongoing process, which has started at 1st 
of January 2018. 
 The Future of Banking Regulation 
BASEL III TILL’ 2021 
“The impact of Basel “IV” will be much greater than initially anticipated. Banks will 
need to raise more capital, and will likely have to take some unconventional 
measures to comply10.”  
In December 2017, the BCBS ended the Basel IV standards formulation, which 
will be implemented in 1st of January 2022. It will focus on forcing banks to 
change the way that their RWA is calculated, which will be independent from the 
risk type hold by the bank. The floor is expected to be around 72.5% by 2027, 
meaning that the Bank’s approach to calculate the RWA cannot fall below that 
value when comparing to the standardize approach, limiting the gains banks can 
incur using internal models. 
Regarding the capital requirements, according to the regulator, they will maintain 
the same at least until 2027, and considering that 2018 marks the last year of the 
“Phase-In” process of the capital requirements of Basel III, Deutsche Bank and 
all its peers, ceteris paribus, will not be affected nor need to do any structural 
changes in their capital structure once everyone of them reveals an excess 
capital over the minimum required.  
Concerning liquidity, the same principle as the capital requirements is applicable. 
The BCBS will maintain the minimum ratio for both NSFR and LCR at 100% in 
the medium-long run (LCR Phased-In process that will end at 2019), not having 
this way a great impact in the bank’s capital structures.   
Bearing in mind the stricter regulation it is predicted that Deutsche Bank’s capital 
ratios will continue to be “comfortably above” the minimum establish by the 
regulators. 
Asset Side - Loans 
Prior to the Financial Crisis of 2008, was a common practice for banks to have a 
great deal of exposure to Mortgage Loans. So, with the start of the crisis, as a 
consequence of the growth in default rates, banks had to handle big amounts of  
 
 
10 
Schneider et al (2017)  “Basel “IV”: What’s next for banks?”, McKinsey & Company, p5. 
Source: Company Reports 
 
Figure 26: Deutsche Bank’s Loan 
Portfolio % 
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impairments and also deal with the collapse of the mortgage backed securities, 
which were mainly formed by pour rating mortgage loans. 
Nowadays banks have changed the way they expose themselves to the different 
types of loans.  
Deutsche Bank is highly exposed to Mortgages Loans, accounting for 37% of its 
Loan Portfolio (80.3% of its Consumer loans). When compared to the years 
immediately before the Housing Crisis, particularly 2007, residential mortgage 
loans only accounted for 22.7% of its total loans, so Deutsche has been 
increasing the amount of Residential Mortgage Loans on its balance sheet. 
Furthermore, comparing to its peers the reality is not that far off. With the 
exception of CitiGroup, which reveals a tendency for the reduction in exposure of 
this type of Residential Mortgage Loans, other banks demonstrate a more stable 
portfolio of mortgages over the last 5 years, as Deutsche Bank does. 
Looking at the loans portfolio as a whole, Deutsche Bank distributes almost 
evenly between consumer and corporate loans, which follow the trend of its 
peers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Housing Market 
It is safe to say that banks are heavily exposed to the housing market, as about 
30% to 40% of their “loan mix” is composed of Residential Mortgage Loans, 
making a careful analysis of this market imperative.  
The housing market is driven by the economic conditions, mainly GDP growth 
and interest rates. At the date of this report, unemployment rates all reaching all-
time lows, negative interest rates set by the ECB, the housing prices are rising. 
Correlation between lagged GDP growth and house prices in the EU reached 
83% during the last 10y11”.  
 
 
11 
Linhart et al (2017)  “Rental market - is renting a dwelling a profitable investment?”, Deloitte, p7. 
Source: Company Reports 
 
Figure 27: % of mortgage loans 
across banks 
Source: Company Report 
 
Figure 28: Credit Suisse’s Loan 
Portfolio % 
 
 
Source: Company Report 
 
Figure 30: CitiGroup’s Loan 
Portfolio % 
 
 
Source: Company Report 
 
Figure 29: Deutsche Bank’s Loan 
Portfolio % 
 
Source: ECB 
 
Figure 31: Housing Prices in 
EURO 19 (2007=100) 
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According to ECB data, when looking at the second quarter of 2018, and 
comparing to the homologous period, growth in housing prices was more than 
4% higher. 
As already shown is this report, future economic growth and interest rates are 
expected to not favour the market, which will limit the price growth in housing for 
the years to come.  In addition the felling of the existence of a market bubble 
starts to grow among investors, which if turns out to be true, can jeopardize 
bank’s positions, and the overall economic as it happened in 2008 (see housing 
bubble in Macroeconomic Context). 
 Loan Impairments 
As already stated, the banking system is fairly exposed to mortgage loans and 
Deutsche Bank is no exception, so a deep analysis to this subject matter 
becomes imperative. Considering this exposure,  Households Loan Impairments 
over the years have counted for about 35% to 40% of the total loan losses that 
Deutsche Bank has registered, followed by Manufacturing / Retail and Wholesale 
accounting for half that, around 13% to 16%. 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Figure 32: Deutsche Bank Loan Losses  (In € m)      
Manufacturing / Wholesale and Retail 1472 1348 1303 1461 1206 
Manufacturing / Wholesale and Retail Growth %  -8% -3% 12% -17% 
Households 3671 3750 3263 2661 2388 
Households Impairment Growth %  2% -13% -18% -10% 
Total 11614 10697 9455 8909 7441 
Source: Company Report      
 
Another important pieces of data, are the consecutive drops in impairment losses 
(in loans) that the bank has registered. In little over 4 years ago, the total loan 
losses and household loan losses plunged more than 35%, explained by the 
favourable economic environment. Furthermore, when comparing this data with 
the rates agreed when granting a loan in the EU, it is easy the conclusion that 
this reduction in loan impairment losses moved alongside with the reduction in 
the interest rates. 
 Loan Expectations 
Interest rates have a great impact in the amount of loans that a bank has in its 
portfolio. Once economic growth is expected to slow down and interest rates to 
increase in the medium-long run, banks will  have a slower growth in their loan 
portfolio, as owning a loan becomes more costly.  
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Additionally, impairment losses will also invert their current trend as interest rates 
will increase. 
Lastly, the Consumer Confidance in Deutsche Bank might play a negative role in 
the demand for loans. 
Deposits and Funding 
Banks fund themselves using Equity, Money Markets, Whole Sale Deposits and 
deposits, which are the most common and expressive way of funding.  
Nowadays interest margins became narrower than ever and banks are constantly 
challenged to cut the spreads in order to capture loans. The better side of the 
decrease in interest rates is that funding costs have decrease a lot. In the EU, the 
interest paid on deposits was on average 2.78% to households in 2011, and 6 
years later this value decreased by almost 90% (Figure 16). Despite this 
reduction in the interest paid to depositors, the annual rate of change has been 
increasing, in special to the corporate segment. (Figure 19). This increase is 
explained in part by the higher salaries and consequently higher saving ratios 
(Figures 35 and 36). 
In recent years banks have increased their deposit base, as a consequence of 
the regulatory requirements imposed. Looking at some examples, Deutsche 
Bank gains special attention for being the one with the largest increase in its 
Deposit/Total Funding Ratio, despite having the one with lowest coverage to 
loans.  
Considering the total funding amount, banks have kept their values stable for the 
last 5 years, but looking at the times prior to the Basel III, reality was much 
different. Deutsche Bank, for example, only had €493Bn in 2007 and it ended 
2017 with more than double that, at around €1014Bn. 
 
 Deposits Expectations 
Looking at the future of deposits, it is expected that they will increase as a 
consequence of the positive economic outlook. As already mentioned in this 
report, interest rates will rise, both in the U.S. and EU, which will lead to an ease 
in the extremely compressed interest margins that banks have to deal with. 
Furthermore, higher interest rates will mean a better return to depositors and 
therefore an incentive that will tend to favour them. 
Despite not as “strong” as in recent years, GDP growth will contribute favourably 
to deposits, once lower unemployment rates lead to higher disposable income. 
Source: ECB 
 
Figure 34: Deutsche Bank’s total 
Funding Amount (in € Bn) 
 
Source: ECB 
 
Figure 35: Past and Forecasted 
savings ratio (%) 
 
Source: International Labor 
Organization 
 
Figure 36: Average Minimum 
Wage (in €)  
 
Source: Company Reports 
 
Figure 33: % of Deposits in 
overall funding structure across 
banks  
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On top of the increased salaries, the higher saving ratios will also benefit bank’s 
funding. 
Bearing in mind Deutsche’s Bank particular case, the future is more uncertain. 
Notwithstanding having increased in more than 10% its deposits over the last 5 
years, consumer confidence on the bank might compromise the deposit growth in 
the future as well as the overall funding of the bank.  
The Future of Banking 
Nowadays banks convey business in a completely different way from past years, 
as technology assumed the main role in day-to-day operations. With this, big tech 
firms start to pose a threat to traditional banks, as they offer a series of more 
personalized, transparent and convenient solutions to its customers. 
The cause of this big threat is the constantly changing consumer behaviour, as 
people start to be more open to use of non-banking financial alternatives in their 
daily-life’s, as Apple, Amazon or Facebook offer. Another problem is the 
invisibility, as “Banks are losing brand awareness and becoming invisible as 
consumers can access financial services without knowing the brand 12”. 
Having understood the power and reach of Fintech firms, banks are starting to 
understand that cooperation between these 2 types of financial institutions might 
be the way to go. For one side banks have the expertise regarding the financials, 
a solid funding structure, a great network of branches and most important of all a 
strong brand recognition. On the other side, Fintech companies are characterized 
by its tech knowledge, disruptive mind-set and consumer focus, characteristics 
that most traditional banks lack.  
In order to capture this swift in the market and as Deutsche Bank did not 
discarded the possible source of revenues from outside the bank structure, the 
bank made an investment in 2 Fintech companies in 2018 alone, Modopayments 
and Quantigous Solutions, in a seek for “to provide new transaction services and 
payment alternatives for the rapidly growing digital economy 13”. 
Deutsche Bank Income Statements 
In order to understand what drives Deutsche Bank’s Net Income over the years 
as well as to forecast it into the future, it is mandatory to explore the company 
structure.  
 
12 
Haering, M (2018). If you can’t beat them, join them - How banks, Fintech and Tech Players can win together. 
[Online] Forbes.com. Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbescommunicationscouncil/2018/04/05/if-you-
cant-beat-them-join-them-how-banks-fintech-and-tech-players-can-win-together 
13  
Michael Spiegel, Deutsche Bank’s head of cash management, Media Release (2018) 
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Deutsche Bank’s activity is currently divided in 3 main market segments: 
Corporate & Investment Bank (CIB), Private and Commercial Bank (PCB) and 
Asset Management (AM). 
Net Revenues 
 Corporate & Investment Bank 
CIB is the most important bank’s division regarding revenues contribution to the 
overall bank’s result. In 2017 it represented more than 54% of the bank’s total 
revenues, however it has to be said that CIB’s results over the years have been 
decreasing severely, due to the hard economic environment around banks. 
Additionally, is a strategic goal to focus on corporate clientele as well as taking 
this division to a European Leader level. 
Deutsche Bank’s CIB division comprises 3 inner divisions, being them Global 
Transaction Banking, Origination & Advisory and Sales & Trading. 
• Global Transaction Banking (GTB) “is a global provider of cash 
management, trade finance and securities services, delivering the full range of 
commercial banking products and services for both corporate clients and 
financial institutions worldwide14”. This division is expected deliver greater results 
in the future, justified by the increase in trade finance and security services 
revenues as well as higher cash management. Additionally a supportive macro-
economic background and interest rates increase go in line with this prevision;  
• Origination & Advisory contribution to overall performance of the bank will 
experience a not expressive increase, at the same rate as the World Economy. 
However is important to notice that market fee volumes will remain constant over 
the next years; 
• Sales & Trading “businesses combines sales, trading and structuring of a 
wide range of financial market products, including bonds, equities and equity-
linked products, exchange-traded and over-the-counter derivatives, foreign 
exchange, money market instruments, and structured products14”. This business 
will benefit from a both favourable equity derivatives and prime finance markets 
as well as FX, Emerging Markets and Interest rates revenues. Emerging markets 
growth and rate interest margin. 
 
 
 
 
14 
Company Report 
 
Figure 37: CIB’s contribution to 
overall Net Revenues   % 
Source: Company Reports 
 
Figure 38: CIB’s Total Revenues 
(in € m)  
 
Source: Company Reports 
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 Private & Commercial Bank   
The Private & Commercial Bank (PCB) activity consist in providing to “its private, 
corporate and wealth management clients with a comprehensive range of 
products from standard banking services to individual investment and financing 
advice, and to drive attractive returns for our shareholders. The product offering 
is supported by a global network, strong capital market and financing expertise 
and innovative digital services 15”. 
Over recent years, the contributions of this commercial segment have grown in 
importance for the bank’s overall result, accounting for around 40% of the total 
net revenues in 2017 versus the 30% in 2013. The PCB’s results are mainly 
driven by the interest rates applicable to both deposits and loans granted to the 
Private and Commercial clients as well as the equity markets, due to the 
investment side of the business.  
According to Deutsche Bank, is part of their own strategic view to focus the 
Private & Commercial Bank in Germany as the bank wants to occupy “the 
number one private and commercial banking position in” its “home market of 
Germany15”. Furthermore, the German market already accounts for more than 
60% of the total PCB’s revenue, so this strategic shift is not impact structurally 
the bank’s division.  
o Private & Commercial Bank Expectations 
This market segment is expected to provide better results in the future, as a 
consequence of favourable interest rate environment for banks that is planned to 
happen by the end of 2019 (interest rates increase by the ECB, that will raise 
interest rate margins). Furthermore, this new geographic strategy will be backed 
by the German economic growth which will play a big and positive role in PCB’s 
financial future.  
 Asset Management 
Deutsche Bank AM is the core division that has the least impact on the bank’s 
overall net revenues performance, contributing around 9% in 2017. The Asset 
Management Division is focused in providing to its customers a personalized 
investment portfolio according their needs, using for that financial products as 
equities, fixed income or even real estate. Its main source of income are the 
management fees associated with the transactions involved in the day-to-day 
investment operations. Having said this, this division’s success is highly  
 
 
15 
Company Report 
Source: Company Report 
 
Figure 39: PCB’s contribution to 
overall Net Revenues % 
 
Figure 40: PCB’s Total Net 
Revenues (in € m)  
 
Source: Company Reports 
 
Figure 41: AM’s contribution to 
overall Net Revenues % 
 
Source: Company Reports 
 
Figure 42: AM’s Total Net 
Revenues (in € m) 
 
Source: Company Reports 
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dependent on the performance of equity markets, global economic growth and 
stable credit markets. Looking into the future, positive world economic growth will 
have a good impact in the overall AM performance.  
Provision for Credit Losses  
The CIB and PCB are the business divisions that most contribute to the bank’s 
total amount of the Provisions for Credit Losses (PCL). As economic conditions 
start to improve around the Globe, the total amount of PCL starts to fall as shown 
in the Figure 43. 
The CIB business is highly exposed to the shipping, metals & mining, oil and gas 
industries resulting extremely correlated results with this sectors. Recently, the 
CIB’s provision for credit losses have decreased significantly both due to a 
reduction and good performance from the portfolios. 
According to forecasts, these industry sectors will benefit from the positive 
economic environment, delivering better results with a strong growth trend, 
leading to an increase in value of the CIB’s portfolio. Conservatively, it is 
estimated that the growth in PCL of this division will be the same as the 
industries that constitute it. 
 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
Figure 44: Industry Sectors  (In € m)      
Transport and Storage 9,484,473 10,079,050 10,724,240 11,410,400 12,131,060 
Transport and Storage Gowth % 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Energy 5,923,081 6,296,993 6,693,993 7,091,273 7,506,952 
Energy Growth % 4% 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Extraction of Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas 2,312,880 2,475,758 2,642,835 2,818,377 3,005,754 
Extraction of Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Growth % 5% 7% 7% 7% 7% 
Metal Products 7,406,192 7,947,505 8,535,387 9,145,658 9,775,664 
Metal Products Growth % 5% 7% 7% 7% 7% 
Source: Company Report      
The PCB has been benefiting from a good economic environment as well as a 
solid portfolio quality as a result of selective portfolio sales back in 2015 and 
2016, not experiencing big changes over the years regarding this topic. The 
same is expected for the future, as is has a stable portfolio. 
Non-Interest Expenses 
The Non-Interest Expenses represent a big portion of overall Deutsche Bank’s 
Financial Activity. Looking at the last years it is possible to notice a clear trend in 
the reduction of this parameter (Figure 45), with exception to 2015, when the 
litigation provision (previously stated) increased this value by a large margin. 
Figure 43: Deutsche Bank’s PCL 
(in € m)  
 
Source: Company Reports 
 
Figure 45: Deutsche Bank’s Non-
Interest Expenses (in € m)  
 
Source: Company Reports 
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This decrease in Non-Interest Expenses is a result of a strategic shift towards a 
cost saving management which has seen some results, with the compression on 
Compensation and Benefits as well as General and Administrative Expenses, the 
larger contributors to this type of expenses. 
As a result of this strategic change, some target numbers have been set. In the 
end of 2021 the goal is to achieve €21Bn in adjusted costs, and according to the 
latest company reports the values are well on track. 
Valuation 
Flow-to-Equity 
In order to proceed the bank’s valuation in this report, the Flow-to-Equity Method 
was used, determined by the formula in Figure 46. In the case of non-financial 
institution, the goal is to separate the operating decisions from the financing 
ones, however in the case of a Bank, these type of decisions cannot be 
distinguish from each other. Regarding the FTE method, both operational and 
financial cash flows are regarded as whole.  
Discount Rate 
In order to compute how much the bank’s operations are worth, the value of each 
annual cash flow was discounted at the Cost of Equity (Re). With the application 
of the commonly used Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Re turned out to 
be 8.42%.  
The elements that went in the CAPM formula as well as its proxies were: 
• The German Stock Index, Dax 30, was used as a proxy for the Market 
Return, yielding an annualized return of 6.55%16;  
• The Risk Free rate was computed through the use of the 10y German 
Bunds, at a rate of 0.32%17 ; 
• The βe, is the slope between the market return (Dax30) and Deutsche 
Bank’s Stock Returns, which turn out to be 1.3016,17.  
 
. 
 
 
 
 16 In order to compute the necessary parameters to apply to the CAPM formula, it was used 5 years of 
monthly data. 
17The 10y German Bunds rate used was at the 01/12/2018.  
 
Figure 46: Flow to Equity Formula 
Figure 47: CAPM Formula 
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Relative Valuation 
The Relative Valuation was used to validate the degree of consistency between 
market and intrinsic valuation. The comparable banks were the ones that 
revealed to have a greater past correlation with Deutsche Bank Stock Price 
movements as well as similar business structure. Being Deutsche Bank a 
financial institution the key ratios used were the P/E and P/B. 
Despite the result obtained from the use of the FTE approach laying between the 
upper and lower boundaries defined by the relative valuation method, the values 
for the intrinsic stock price using the Price to Book Value ratio were completely 
far off from the current bank’s reality. Deutsche Bank has an extremely low P/B 
ratio, which is about 70% lower than the average in the segment. A P/B ratio 
under 1 denotes that the stock is valued at a discount relatively to equity book 
value, but in this case, the lower P/B ratio means that Deutsche Bank is 
perceived as a riskier investment when compared to its peers, because it is 
highly exposed to trading assets in its balance sheet, which are by nature a more 
volatile asset class, leading to a larger harmful potential in case of not favourable 
market conditions. 
In the other hand, the estimated stock price using the Price to Earnings average 
ratio is closer to the reality, being just 6% higher than the one that resulted from 
the FTE method. However this ratio usually produces unreliable valuation 
outcomes, as bank’s results tend to me more volatile when compared to other 
business sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All in all, at the time of this report the use of this valuation method might not the 
one that better suits the Deutsche Bank current reality.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to complement to the analysis made by the FTE Valuation Method, it 
was estimated the impact of possible changes / departures from the original 
scenario. 
  
P/E 
P/E 
Intrinsic Stock Price 
 
P/B 
P/B 
Intrinsic Stock Price 
     
Mean 7.71 €8.35 0.71 €23.83 
Median 7.51 €8.14 0.77 €25.90 
Maximum 9.17 €9.94 0.99 €33.16 
Minimum 6.67 €7.23 0.23 €7.69 
Range 2.50  0.76  
Source: Bloomberg     
Source: Company Reports 
Figure 49: Percentage of Trading 
Assets per Total Assets (in %) 
Source: Bloomberg 
Figure 48: List of Banks used in 
Relative Valuation 
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In this Sensitivity Analysis the changes in the bank’s Cost of Equity (Re) and 
Perpetuity Growth rate were analysed, as they are elements with a big impact in 
the overall valuation process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once is part of the bank’s strategy to focus on the German market, the 
“Perpetuity Growth Rate” was set at 1.38% (average forecasted German GDP 
growth rate 18 per year from 2023 until 2060). Fixing it at the base scenario it is 
easily concluded that the Re has a big importance in the overall price estimation, 
since an increase in 20%, from the original 8.42%, might lead to a decrease of 
about 28% in the estimated stock price. The Perpetuity Growth Rate has a 
smaller impact in this analysis, when compared to the Re.  
For Deutsche Bank, in its worst case scenario, the stock price would be €6.07 
per share as in the best case scenario the price would reach €11.24 per share, 
which translates in a deviation from the original estimated from of about 24% and 
40% respectively. Attending the current stock price for Deutsche Bank, both 
scenarios are considered unlikely. 
Final Conclusions 
As already been stated during the current report, Deutsche Bank is facing 
uncertain times, mainly resulting from large depreciations in the stock markets, 
large annual losses and the lost in market share in its home country. Despite this 
recent and continuous deterioration of the bank’s financials it is believed that the 
future reserve better results for the bank. Future economic environment is expect 
to play a positive role in the banking system, as interest rates increase there will 
be an ease the highly compressed margins banks have to deal with. 
Notwithstanding, and bearing in mind the elements above stated, the price target 
yielded by the FTE method for the end of 2019 is €7.93, which translates in a 
“BUY” recommendation. 
 
 18 International Monetary Fund 
 
  Cost of Equity (Re) 
 7.93 € 6.73% 7.58% 8.42% 9.26% 10.10% 
 1.11% 10.21 € 8.76 € 7.66 € 6.78 € 6.07 € 
 1.24% 10.45 € 8.94 € 7.79 € 6.88 € 6.15 € 
Perpetuity 
Growth Rate  1.38% 10.70 € 9.12 € 
 
7.93 € 6.99 € 6.24 € 
 1.52% 10.96 € 9.32 € 8.08 € 7.11 € 6.33 € 
 1.66% 11.24 € 9.52 € 8.23 € 7.23 € 6.42 € 
Source: Analyst’s Estimates     
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Appendix 
Financial Statements 
Balance Sheet 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
(In € m., unless stated otherwise) 
 
       
Assets        
Cash & Central Bank Balances 225655 223082 229796 236258 242526 249420 256807 
Interbank Balances (w/o Central Banks) 9265 9159 9435 9700 9958 10241 10544 
Central Banks Funds Sold € Securities 
purchased under resale agreements 
9971 9857 10154 10439 10716 11021 11348 
Securities Borrowed 16732 16541 17039 17518 17983 18494 19042 
Total Financial Assets at Fair Value through 
profit or loss 
636969 629706 648659 666897 684593 704053 724904 
Financial Assets Available for Sale 49397 48834 50304 51718 53090 54599 56216 
Equity Method Investments 866 856 882 907 931 957 986 
Loans 401699 397119 409071 420573 431732 444005 457155 
Securities held to Maturity 3170 3134 3228 3319 3407 3504 3608 
Property and Equipment 2663 2633 2712 2788 2862 2943 3031 
Goodwill and other Intangible Assets 8839 8738 9001 9254 9500 9770 10059 
Other Assets 101491 100337 103354 106260 109079 112180 115502 
Assets for Current Tax 1215 1201 1237 1272 1306 1343 1383 
Deferred Tax Assets 6799 6721 6924 7118 7307 7515 7738 
Total Assets 1474731 1457916 1501797 1544022 1584991 1630045 1678322 
 
 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
(In € m., unless stated otherwise) 
 
       
Liabilities        
Deposits 580812 574616 591552 608251 623787 640753 659431 
Central Banks Funds Purchased & Securities 
Sold under resale agreements 
15105 17912 18440 18960 19445 19973 20556 
Securities Loaned 6617 6812 7004 7183 7378 7378 7593 
Total Financial Liabilities at fair value 
through profit or loss 
478636 473530 487486 501248 514051 528032 543424 
Other short-term borrowings 18411 18215 18751 19281 19773 20311 20903 
Other Liabilities 132208 130798 134653 138454 141990 145852 150104 
Provisions 5219 5163 5316 5466 5605 5758 5925 
Liabilities for current tax 1001 990 1020 1048 1075 1104 1136 
Deferred tax Liabilities 346 342 352 362 372 382 393 
Long-Term Debt 159715 158011 162668 167260 171533 176198 181334 
Trust preferred securities 5491 5432 5593 5750 5897 6058 6234 
Obligation to purchase common shares  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Liabilities 1406632 1391627 1432641 1473084 1510711 1551800 1597034 
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Equity        
Common Shares, no par value, nominal value of 
€2.56 
5291 5291 5291 5291 5291 5291 5291 
Additional paid-in capital 39918 35752 36478 37383 36538 36799 36907 
Retained earnings 17454 18870 21110 24226 28179 32468 36856 
Common shares in treasury, at cost -9 -9 -9 -9 -10 -10 -10 
Equity classified obligation to purchase common 
shares  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Accumulated other comprehensive income 
(loss), net of tax 
520 1517 1270 -1108 -1011 -1747 -3361 
Total shareholder’s equity 63174 61420 64140 65782 68987 72801 75683 
Additional equity components 4675 4622 4761 4895 5025 5167 5320 
No controlling interest 252 247 255 262 269 276 285 
Total Equity 68099 66289 69155 70938 74200 78245 81288 
Total Liabilities and Equity 1474731 1457916 1501797 1544022 1584991 1630045 16778322 
 
Corporate  Investment Bank 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
        
(In € m., unless stated otherwise)        
Global Transaction Banking 3917 3767 3915 4051 4182 4311 4441 
Equity Origination 396 396 411 426 439 543 467 
Debt Origination 1327 1178 1224 1267 1308 1348 1389 
Advisory 508 439 431 446 460 474 489 
Origination and Advisory 2231 2013 2066 2138 2207 2276 2344 
Sales & Trading (Equity) 2247 2046 2075 2110 2149 2195 2262 
Sales & Trading (FIC) 6434 5899 5984 6085 6195 6329 6522 
Sales & Trading 8681 7945 8059 8196 8344 8524 8784 
Other -603 -94 -69 -83 -111 -121 -180 
Total Net Revenues 14226 13630 13972 14301 14622 14990 15390 
Provision for Credit Losses 816 213 140 149 159 170 180 
Total Non-Interest Expenses 12890 12390 12020 11661 11313 11598 11907 
No controlling Interests -26 -28 -34 -30 -31 -32 -31 
Net Income (loss) 1096 1078 1777 2461 3119 3191 3272 
        
Consolidated Statement of Income 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
        
(In € m., unless stated otherwise)        
Total Net Revenues 25921 25893 26556 27123 27664 28267 28929 
Provision for Credit Losses 526 484 649 621 603 608 627 
Compensation and Benefits 12253 7821 7559 7319 7093 7130 7296 
General and Administrative Expenses 11973 10309 10026 9739 9454 9504 9724 
Policyholder Benefits and Claims 0 4890 4744 4603 4465 4488 4593 
Impairment of Goodwill and other Intangible 
Assets 
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Restructuring Activities 447 331 321 312 303 304 311 
Total Non-Interest Expenses 24695 23352 22651 21972 21315 21426 21924 
Profit (loss) before tax 1226 3057 3256 4529 5747 6233 6379 
Income Tax Expense 1963 642 1016 1413 1793 1945 1990 
Net Income (loss) -737 1416 2240 3116 3954 4288 4389 
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Private & Commercial Bank 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
        
(In € m., unless stated otherwise)        
Private & Commercial Clients 5013 - - - - - - 
Postbank 3124 - - - - - - 
Private & Commercial Business (Germany) * - 6897 7044 7122 7192 7265 7342 
Private & Commercial Business (International) - 1443 1500 1552 1602 1562 1701 
Wealth Management 2041 1766 1836 1899 1961 2022 2082 
Total Net Revenues 10178 10107 10380 10573 10755 10939 11126 
Provision for credit losses 313 349 506 469 441 436 444 
Total Non-Interest Expenses 9411 8873 8608 8350 8101 8239 8380 
No controlling Interests -12 1 -4 -5 -3 -4 -4 
Net Income (loss) 466 885 1270 1758 2216 2267 2306 
        
Assets (at period end) 333069 344865 361688 377734 393223 408884 425187 
RWA (at period end) 87472 89781 94161 98338 102371 106448 110692 
 
 
Asset Management 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
        
(In € m., unless stated otherwise)        
Management Fees 2247 2137 2175 3306 2237 2272 2319 
Performance & Transaction Fees 199 88 94 104 109 122 148 
Other Revenues 86 25 25 25 25 25 26 
Total Net Revenues 2532 2250 2294 2335 2371 2419 2493 
Provision for credit losses 1 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 
Total Non-Interest Expenses 1799 1705 1655 1605 1557 1589 1637 
No controlling Interests 1 -32 -10 -14 -19 -14 -16 
Net Income (loss) 733 513 629 716 796 817 841 
        
Assets (at period end) 8050 9469 9657 9828 9981 10183 10493 
RWA (at period end) 8432 9703 9895 10071 10228 10435 10752 
        
 
Corporate & Other 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
        
(In € m., unless stated otherwise)        
Total Net Revenues -488 -94 -90 -87 -84 -81 -79 
Provision for credit losses 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Total Non-Interest Expenses 594 390 374 361 350 339 329 
No controlling Interests -16 -113 -108 -105 -101 -98 -95 
Net Income (loss) -1098 -599 -576 -556 -538 -521 -505 
        
Assets (at period end) 12585 11818 11354 10961 10606 10277 9968 
RWA (at period end) 16734 15714 15097 14574 14103 13665 13254 
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Free Cash Flow to Equity 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2023 Perp. 
       
(In € m., unless stated otherwise)       
Net Income 2240 3116 3954 4288 4389 - 
Change in Assets 43881 42226 40969 45054 48277 - 
Change in Liabilities 41014 40443 37627 41089 45234 - 
g (Perpetuity Growth)      1.38% 
FCFTE -626 1333 612 324 1346 1364 
FCTE (T=0) -626 1229 520 254 974 14039 
       
Equity Value 16391      
# Shares Outstanding (In m.) 2067      
Price Per Share €7.93      
       
       
 
Regulatory Capital 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
        
(In € m., unless stated otherwise)        
Common Equity Tier 1 Capital 48300 53194 54686 56129 57532 59080 60754 
Tier 1 Capital 52921 60286 3 3 3 3 3 
Total Capital 63250 61547 -108 -105 -101 -98 -95 
        
Risk-Weighted Assets 344212 354626 364575 374195 383544 393865 405027 
Common Equity Tier 1 Capital Ratio 14% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 
Common Equity Tier 1 Capital Ratio Required 9.5% 10.5% - - - - - 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio  15.4% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Required 11% 12.2% - - - - - 
Total Capital Ratio 18.4% 17.4% 17.6% 18% 18.5% 18.7% 19% 
Total Capital Ratio Required 13% 14.2% - - - - - 
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Disclosures and Disclaimers 
 
Report  Recommendations 
Buy Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
of more than 10% over a 12-month period. 
Hold Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
between 0% and 10% over a 12-month period. 
Sell Expected negative total return (including expected capital gains and expected 
dividend yield) over a 12-month period. 
 
 
This report was prepared by Eduardo Mota, a Master in Finance student of Nova School of Business and 
Economics (“Nova SBE”), within the context of the Direct Research Internship – Alternative Track. 
This report is issued and published exclusively for academic purposes, namely for academic evaluation and 
master graduation purposes, within the context of said Direct Research Internship. It is not to be construed as 
an offer or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security or financial instrument. 
This report was supervised by a Nova SBE faculty member, acting merely in an academic capacity, who 
revised the valuation methodology and the financial model. 
Given the exclusive academic purpose of the reports produced by Nova SBE students, it is Nova SBE 
understanding that Nova SBE, the author, the present report and its publishing, are excluded from the 
persons and activities requiring previous registration from local regulatory authorities. As such, Nova SBE, its 
faculty and the author of this report have not sought or obtained registration with or certification as financial 
analyst by any local regulator, in any jurisdiction. In Portugal, neither the author of this report nor his/her 
academic supervisor is registered with or qualified under COMISSÃO DO MERCADO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOS 
(“CMVM”, the Portuguese Securities Market Authority) as a financial analyst. No approval for publication or 
distribution of this report was required and/or obtained from any local authority, given the exclusive academic 
nature of the report. 
The additional disclaimers also apply: 
USA: Pursuant to Section 202 (a) (11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, neither Nova SBE nor the 
author of this report are to be qualified as an investment adviser and, thus, registration with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”, United States of America’s securities market authority) is not necessary. 
Neither the author nor Nova SBE receive any compensation of any kind for the preparation of the reports. 
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Germany: Pursuant to §34c of the WpHG (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, i.e., the German Securities Trading 
Act), this entity is not required to register with or otherwise notify the Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (“BaFin”, the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority). It should be 
noted that Nova SBE is a fully-owned state university and there is no relation between the student’s equity 
reports and any fund raising programme. 
UK: Pursuant to section 22 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the “FSMA”), for an activity to be 
a regulated activity, it must be carried on “by way of business”. All regulated activities are subject to prior 
authorization by the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”). However, this report serves an exclusively 
academic purpose and, as such, was not prepared by way of business. The author - a Master’s student - is 
the sole and exclusive responsible for the information, estimates and forecasts contained herein, and for 
the opinions expressed, which exclusively reflect his/her own judgment at the date of the report. Nova SBE 
and its faculty have no single and formal position in relation to the most appropriate valuation method, 
estimates or projections used in the report and may not be held liable by the author’s choice of the latter. 
The information contained in this report was compiled by students from public sources believed to be reliable, 
but Nova SBE, its faculty, or the students make no representation that it is accurate or complete, and accept 
no liability whatsoever for any direct or indirect loss resulting from the use of this report or of its content. 
Students are free to choose the target companies of the reports. Therefore, Nova SBE may start covering 
and/or suspend the coverage of any listed company, at any time, without prior notice. The students or Nova 
SBE are not responsible for updating this report, and the opinions and recommendations expressed herein 
may change without further notice. 
The target company or security of this report may be simultaneously covered by more than one student. 
Because each student is free to choose the valuation method, and make his/her own assumptions and 
estimates, the resulting projections, price target and recommendations may differ widely, even when referring 
to the same security. Moreover, changing market conditions and/or changing subjective opinions may lead to 
significantly different valuation results. Other students’ opinions, estimates and recommendations, as well as 
the advisor and other faculty members’ opinions may be inconsistent with the views expressed in this report. 
Any recipient of this report should understand that statements regarding future prospects and performance 
are, by nature, subjective, and may be fallible. 
This report does not necessarily mention and/or analyze all possible risks arising from the investment in the 
target company and/or security, namely the possible exchange rate risk resulting from the security being 
denominated in a currency either than the investor’s currency, among many other risks. 
The purpose of publishing this report is merely academic and it is not intended for distribution among private 
investors. The information and opinions expressed in this report are not intended to be available to any 
person other than Portuguese natural or legal persons or persons domiciled in Portugal. While preparing this 
report, students did not have in consideration the specific investment objectives, financial situation or  
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particular needs of any specific person. Investors should seek financial advice regarding the appropriateness 
of investing in any security, namely in the security covered by this report. 
The author hereby certifies that the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his/her personal opinion 
about the target company and its securities. He/ She has not received or been promised any direct or indirect 
compensation for expressing the opinions or recommendation included in this report. 
[If applicable, it shall be added: “While preparing the report, the author may have performed an internship 
(remunerated or not) in Deutsche Bank. This Company may have or have had an interest in the covered 
company or security” and/ or “A draft of the reports have been shown to the covered company’s officials 
(Investors Relations Officer or other), mainly for the purpose of correcting inaccuracies, and later modified, 
prior to its publication.”]  
The content of each report has been shown or made public to restricted parties prior to its publication in Nova 
SBE’s website or in Bloomberg Professional, for academic purposes such as its distribution among faculty 
members for students’ academic evaluation. 
Nova SBE is a state-owned university, mainly financed by state subsidies, students tuition fees and 
companies, through donations, or indirectly by hiring educational programs, among other possibilities. Thus, 
Nova SBE may have received compensation from the target company during the last 12 months, related to its 
fundraising programs, or indirectly through the sale of educational, consulting or research services. 
Nevertheless, no compensation eventually received by Nova SBE is in any way related to or dependent on 
the opinions expressed in this report. The Nova School of Business and Economics does not deal for or 
otherwise offer any investment or intermediation services to market counterparties, private or intermediate 
customers. 
This report may not be reproduced, distributed or published, in whole or in part, without the explicit previous 
consent of its author, unless when used by Nova SBE for academic purposes only. At any time, Nova SBE 
may decide to suspend this report reproduction or distribution without further notice. Neither this document 
nor any copy of it may be taken, transmitted or distributed, directly or indirectly, in any country either than 
Portugal or to any resident outside this country. The dissemination of this document other than in Portugal or 
to Portuguese citizens is therefore prohibited and unlawful. 
